0_public:regulations_and_compliance:sanctions:shadow_fleet
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| 0_public:regulations_and_compliance:sanctions:shadow_fleet [2025/01/22 22:16] – ↷ Page moved from 0_public:sanctions:shadow_fleet to 0_public:regulations_and_compliance:sanctions:shadow_fleet pointnm | 0_public:regulations_and_compliance:sanctions:shadow_fleet [2025/01/29 20:57] (current) – pointnm | ||
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| ====== Shadow Fleet ====== | ====== Shadow Fleet ====== | ||
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| + | Vortexa suggests that non-sanctioned shadow vessels could continue carrying Russian oil to China, as the shorter distance means the number of tankers required is relatively small.((https:// | ||
| There are estimates that the Russian shadow fleet ships a little more than 80% of Russian seaborne crude oil exports. And while the true size of the shadow fleet is unknown, there are estimates that it could be as many as 600 tankers. S&P Global estimates the size of the tanker fleet at 586 vessels, which suggests that around 25% of the shadow fleet has been sanctioned. This could put around 700k b/d of Russian crude oil at risk. Losing this volume would wipe out the surplus that we expect for the global oil market this year.((https:// | There are estimates that the Russian shadow fleet ships a little more than 80% of Russian seaborne crude oil exports. And while the true size of the shadow fleet is unknown, there are estimates that it could be as many as 600 tankers. S&P Global estimates the size of the tanker fleet at 586 vessels, which suggests that around 25% of the shadow fleet has been sanctioned. This could put around 700k b/d of Russian crude oil at risk. Losing this volume would wipe out the surplus that we expect for the global oil market this year.((https:// | ||
0_public/regulations_and_compliance/sanctions/shadow_fleet.1737584203.txt.gz · Last modified: 2025/01/22 22:16 by pointnm